Martin Heidegger was a philosopher who created a worldview that divided objects into two classifications. The first of these described objects that are encountered every day and are viewed as objects that fulfill a task or are tools and are inconspicuous to consciousness. The second classification of objects are present to active consciousness through inspection in certain, special cases. These two classifications are able to encompass all objects that one meets in life. However, there are problems that appear when analyzing these classifications. One such problem is the question of misusing an object, or rather using an object for a purpose for which it is not intended. With these two classifications of objects, it would appear that the use of an object for a purpose that it is not intended is impossible or without validation. However, upon further analysis, and through using the concept of fulfillment, created by Heidegger’s teacher Edmund Husserl, the possibility of this observable, real world phenomenon is brought to light.
Fulfillment, as Husserl describes, is an act that achieves a relation and leads to knowledge. In order to obtain knowledge, fulfillment has a number of requirements. Fulfillment first requires at least two mental acts. One of these acts is the signitive act - the internalized concept of something. A signitive is empty because it lacks reference to an object that is real, or exists in the world. The other required mental act is the intuitive act, which is the perception of the real object. Fulfillment also requires that these two acts knowingly refer to the same object in consciousness as it is meant. This is vital because a connection, or relation, will form between the two mental acts. If it is unknown by the individual that his perception is referring to a signitive act in one’s mind, then the perception would end there and be of no importance. No knowledge would have been created. Nevertheless, the connection made between the signitive and intuitive act can exist. This connection is the most vital part of fulfillment and explains how perception can allow for the creation of knowledge. After the connection has been made, the signitive act is no longer empty because it has a real reference. The higher order act of fulfillment provides substance to internal thoughts. Furthermore, perceptions can be used to reevaluate the signitive act to better match reality (Logical Investigations, Investigation VI).
Fulfillment occurs, but a single observation of the object does not necessarily provide exhaustive knowledge of an object. When the initial link is created between the signitive and the intuitive act, the fulfillment can be described as partial because not all of the information on an object is taken into the internalized model of the object. However, over time, experience, and investigation, a signitive act of an object can become known as more fulfilled. A more fulfilled signitive act for an object possesses a greater amount of information pertaining to that object as it has had a wider number of perceptions relating to it. Additional investigations can provide more information on an object making it more and more fulfilled over time, though it is still considered a partial fulfillment because the mental concept is not yet been completed. Eventually, once all available perceptions have been exhausted and everything that can be known about an object is know, then the designation of the signitive act changes. The signitive act, at this point, has become fully fulfilled (Logical Investigations, Investigation VI, Chapter 5).
Examples of Husserlian fulfillment occur in everyday life and can be seen in the following anecdote. One day, I went grocery shopping and picked up some sausage. I grabbed, for variety, a package of fennel sausage. I was grilling the sausages and my roommate came into the kitchen. I told him I was making some fennel sausage. He asked what fennel was. I replied, stating that it was an herb that tasted mildly of licorice. In this exchange, he developed a mental concept of what fennel would taste like; he had a signitive act to describe it. Upon tasting the sausage with fennel my roommate had a perception of the flavor, which was the intuitive act. He knew that what he tasted was fennel and so assigned the flavor he was perceiving to the signitive act of his concept of fennel flavor. As a result, he gains knowledge actual knowledge of what flavor fennel is. Despite the actual experience of tasting the fennel, this was only partial fulfillment. The taste of fennel was hidden behind pork and other seasonings found in the sausage. However, for him to try pure fennel, he would be able to repeat the process for the fennel in the fennel sausage, but have the act fully fulfilled because it would provide the true sense of the taste.
Husserl’s view on fulfillment is very important because it allows perception to affect or create knowledge. This will play an important role in the description of fulfillment within Heidegger’s worldview. In Heidegger’s world, there exist two types of objects. The first type of objects is seen upon entering into the world and in everyday interactions with the world. One is born in the world of equipmental totalities. These are the ready-to-hand objects. Ready-to-hand objects are objects that exist in-order-to. We have little knowledge of their deeper sense, but merely a matter of what they are useful for. Their existence and purpose are derived from their function. We initially see a world full of such objects, each of these objects equipment for our interaction with the world: a hammer hammers; a door keeps people out; food feeds. Equipmental totalities describe this interaction between objects in the world and the individual. An equipmental totality sees an object existing for the sole purpose of being used to complete a task. Because an object in its ready-to-hand form exists in order to, equipmental totalities are constructed between objects – a hammer exists to hammer a nail. This sort of relationship is still functional is an equipmental totality, but expresses how objects can interact. Knowledge of the objects is limited in all cases to equipmental totalities as the meaning of the objects is only the purpose that the object fulfills. This meaning is one that is not a property derived through inspection, but known and utilized intuitively. The objects only have this equipmental totality. Consequently, ready-to-hand objects are described as being inconspicuous and escape deeper inspection. Knowledge of their properties does not exist (Being and Time, Section 15).
Knowledge of an object does exist if a ready-to-hand object exists. The knowledge exists because of and through an equipmental totality. As Husserl described knowledge, understanding of a ready-to-hand object is a product of fulfillment. However, this form of knowledge can only exist as an empty fulfillment because extensive and exhaustive knowledge does not exist. The signitive act is created because one saw a new object, for example a hammer. In learning the purpose of the hammer, one has created an intuitive act, which is then assigned to the object present to perceptions. This explains how the basic concept of what a hammer is, hammerness, is created. The link is made from the knowledge of the purpose of the object, a hammer hammers, and leads to the creation of knowledge relating to this object. It also explains how upon having the experience of the hammer, that one can hold the concept in ones mind and draw on it from time to time, such as the next time one needs to hammer use a hammer. Additional knowledge can exist concerning an object that is being viewed as ready-to-hand, but does not exist because of the nature of an object that is ready-to-hand. Such an object escapes one’s active consciousness and inspection, so that one does not have knowledge of the object beyond intuitively knowing what its purpose is. One will not know that this hammer is best used for a certain function or even the traits beyond the use that makes up hammerness. To obtain knowledge beyond this level, one must view the object in a different manner.
Viewing the object in a different manner creates a different type of object, an object that is present-at-hand. Present-at-hand objects are understood in a markedly different way from ready-to-hand. These are objects inspected deeply and which are conspicuous to one’s active conscious. This difference is best illuminated in the conversion of an object from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand. Objects gain their designation as present-at-hand, as Heidegger describes, from an exceptional experience of the object. The exceptional experience is something that brings the ready-to-hand object to the forefront of active consciousness and can be a missing object or an object that fails to function as expected. To continue the example of the hammer, imagine trying to hammer a nail into a wall to hang a painting with a forty-pound sledgehammer. This will obviously fail, as a sledgehammer is too large to hammer the nail properly. This fact is marked by the new, sledgehammer shaped, hole in the wall. Because of the failure of this hammer to work as a hammer, we are forced to try to understand why it failed. In doing so, the object is no longer viewed as ready-to-hand, but has come to our active, conscious analysis as present-at-hand (Being and Time, Section 16).
This additional analysis of the object expands the available knowledge of an object’s properties, and in so produces a more fulfilled concept of the object. As it stood before the investigation, we had a signitive act of an object, a hammer. We merely knew what the equipmental totality of the hammer was. We know nothing but how to use intuitively an object to fulfill a purpose. However, upon the conscious investigation, one learns of the properties associated with the object. For the case of the sledgehammer, we learn that this hammer is not used for driving small nails into a wall because it is too large and unwieldy. We can even gain understanding of what makes up a hammer - its head and handle with each made of a hard substance to withstand the stress of hammering something. The properties of other hammers can also become known, such as the desirable size for a hammer to use on nails. This, in a sense, is learning through failure. However, because one now has this conscious experience of the properties of this and other hammers, derived from an intuitive act, one can create a greater level of knowledge by reevaluating and expanding on our previous definition, or signitive act, of hammers.
The fulfillment of the signitive act of a present-at-hand object is the result of the active, conscious inspection. Upon the additional features of the object - the size and structure of a hammer for example - being brought out by active consciousness, one can assign more traits to an object. Husserl’s account of knowledge required that the object for which knowledge is created be conscious to the mind. This was a requirement so that a reference between the intuitive and signitive acts could be established in order to increase knowledge. An object that is ready-to-hand, by comparison, only has the intuitively accessed information of the function, but not of the features. Additionally, the object cannot be fully fulfilled through a single failure of the object to function. But with each failure, new, additional features of the object, now present-at-hand, are brought to light. As time passes, our concept, or signitive act of the object becomes fuller.
The interesting case of misusing an object becomes clear in the light of this view of Heideggerean objects. The example comes from a time when needing to use a hammer to hammer a nail. No hammer was present to complete this task, but a wrench was present and was successfully used to hammer a nail. Misusing an object, such as using a wrench to hammer a nail, seems impossible with objects existing only as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. As an exceptional experience of a hammer, this event could bring to active consciousness and conspicuousness the properties of a hammer through the search for the hammer: a quest for the hammerness of the hammer. This explains how knowledge of the hammer increases through the object’s absence. However, it does not explain how the object that is misused takes the functional place of the object that is absent. The validation for this possibility cannot be seen directly in the presence of the categories of objects themselves. The properties of the wrench are not known when it is ready-to-hand. This is because the wrench is ready-to-hand in the room but is not failing to perform its function. It is not performing any function, so it cannot be present-at-hand and therefore it is not present to consciousness in a way that its properties may be determined through analysis. Despite these facts, this phenomenon of misuse still exists.
The answer to this problem comes in Husserl’s form of fulfillment. Initially the hammer is in the ready-to-hand form and so its fulfillment is lacking, but from experience, one is placed in situations in which the hammer fails to function. In the specific case of misuse, its absence creates the failure. Such failures act to increase our concept of a hammer, and over time, slowly making our signitive act of hammer more fulfilled to the point, when necessary, where one can see a hammer as more than just an object that hammers. However, in its common everydayness we still view and interact with a hammer by its equipmental totality. Over time, experience adds to our understanding of what a hammer is beyond its function and the understanding can be drawn on whenever it is needed. A similar series of occurrences would cause for the properties of the wrench to become a more fulfilled signitive act. These two mental acts would then interact. One would inspect the objects in the world looking for objects with similar properties to a hammer, notably the weight, the general size, the material of construction and other such important traits. The two objects that share these properties could be used interchangeably for a certain purpose – one would not use a block of cheese to hammer a nail. The wrench has the properties that hammer needs to function as a hammer, though it is not specialized for that specific function, so that in the absence of a hammer a wrench could hammer a nail.
The final question concerning how misusing a tool is possible is what drives the interaction of these mental acts that constitute our signitive acts of a hammer and a wrench to interact. In other words, what makes this interaction possible with two unrelated objects and without prior experience? The possibility of this becomes known through Heidegger’s exploration of the concept of dasein. Dasein’s translation is literally being there, or existence. Heidegger used dasein to describe the part of an entity that is concerned with Being. Being is the concern for the nature or meaning of something. Dasein would allow for questioning what it means to be a hammer. Through an analysis of our concept of a hammer and the task that needs to be completed, one would find the appropriate traits that make up Being-a-hammer-as-itself. The traits that allow for something Being-a-hammer are found present in other objects. Dasein would drive the mind to view other objects in a different manner than just its function and one would then develop a concept of how different objects could perform the task of being a hammer. These objects would have the potential of Being-a-hammer. This analysis would in turn lead to the realization that a wrench could perform this task - Being-a-wrench-as-a-hammer - and would facilitate our misusage of this object to fulfill our goal of hammering a nail (Being and Time, Sections 12 and 13).
Husserl’s view of fulfillment becomes vital to Heidegger’s view of objects in the world because there is a necessity for gaining knowledge about the objects for them to serve a purpose and for interactions to take place. The world is full of objects that are ready-to-hand. However, to prevent one from having to relearn the purpose of each of these objects every time one is viewed, fulfillment must occur to construct lasting knowledge. This knowledge validates the ease that one can operate in a world of known equipmental totalities. However, when one of these objects, and its equipmental totality, fails to function, an object comes to the forefront of active consciousness. The object is inspected and the properties of the object, beyond its equipmental totality, are ascertained. These properties are added to the mental concept of an object as the signitive act is further fulfilled. Though one operates in a world of equipmental totalities, knowledge beyond the intuitive use of the totality is stored for future use and available when needed. This can be seen in misusing a tool when the proper tool for the task is not available. Because both the tool for the task and the tool that is misused to complete the task have signitive acts that were further fulfilled when the objects were present-at-hand, these properties can be compared through dasein in order to determine another object that would suit the task needing to be completed. The potential for the misused object as Being-as-another-object would be discovered so that the object can then be located and used in the world to fulfill a task outside of that object’s equipmental totality.
Work Cited
Heidegger, Martin. Trans: Macquarrie and Robinson. Being and Time. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1962
Husserl, Edmund. Trans: Findlay. The Shorter Logical Investigations. New York: Routledge, 1970.
Fulfillment, as Husserl describes, is an act that achieves a relation and leads to knowledge. In order to obtain knowledge, fulfillment has a number of requirements. Fulfillment first requires at least two mental acts. One of these acts is the signitive act - the internalized concept of something. A signitive is empty because it lacks reference to an object that is real, or exists in the world. The other required mental act is the intuitive act, which is the perception of the real object. Fulfillment also requires that these two acts knowingly refer to the same object in consciousness as it is meant. This is vital because a connection, or relation, will form between the two mental acts. If it is unknown by the individual that his perception is referring to a signitive act in one’s mind, then the perception would end there and be of no importance. No knowledge would have been created. Nevertheless, the connection made between the signitive and intuitive act can exist. This connection is the most vital part of fulfillment and explains how perception can allow for the creation of knowledge. After the connection has been made, the signitive act is no longer empty because it has a real reference. The higher order act of fulfillment provides substance to internal thoughts. Furthermore, perceptions can be used to reevaluate the signitive act to better match reality (Logical Investigations, Investigation VI).
Fulfillment occurs, but a single observation of the object does not necessarily provide exhaustive knowledge of an object. When the initial link is created between the signitive and the intuitive act, the fulfillment can be described as partial because not all of the information on an object is taken into the internalized model of the object. However, over time, experience, and investigation, a signitive act of an object can become known as more fulfilled. A more fulfilled signitive act for an object possesses a greater amount of information pertaining to that object as it has had a wider number of perceptions relating to it. Additional investigations can provide more information on an object making it more and more fulfilled over time, though it is still considered a partial fulfillment because the mental concept is not yet been completed. Eventually, once all available perceptions have been exhausted and everything that can be known about an object is know, then the designation of the signitive act changes. The signitive act, at this point, has become fully fulfilled (Logical Investigations, Investigation VI, Chapter 5).
Examples of Husserlian fulfillment occur in everyday life and can be seen in the following anecdote. One day, I went grocery shopping and picked up some sausage. I grabbed, for variety, a package of fennel sausage. I was grilling the sausages and my roommate came into the kitchen. I told him I was making some fennel sausage. He asked what fennel was. I replied, stating that it was an herb that tasted mildly of licorice. In this exchange, he developed a mental concept of what fennel would taste like; he had a signitive act to describe it. Upon tasting the sausage with fennel my roommate had a perception of the flavor, which was the intuitive act. He knew that what he tasted was fennel and so assigned the flavor he was perceiving to the signitive act of his concept of fennel flavor. As a result, he gains knowledge actual knowledge of what flavor fennel is. Despite the actual experience of tasting the fennel, this was only partial fulfillment. The taste of fennel was hidden behind pork and other seasonings found in the sausage. However, for him to try pure fennel, he would be able to repeat the process for the fennel in the fennel sausage, but have the act fully fulfilled because it would provide the true sense of the taste.
Husserl’s view on fulfillment is very important because it allows perception to affect or create knowledge. This will play an important role in the description of fulfillment within Heidegger’s worldview. In Heidegger’s world, there exist two types of objects. The first type of objects is seen upon entering into the world and in everyday interactions with the world. One is born in the world of equipmental totalities. These are the ready-to-hand objects. Ready-to-hand objects are objects that exist in-order-to. We have little knowledge of their deeper sense, but merely a matter of what they are useful for. Their existence and purpose are derived from their function. We initially see a world full of such objects, each of these objects equipment for our interaction with the world: a hammer hammers; a door keeps people out; food feeds. Equipmental totalities describe this interaction between objects in the world and the individual. An equipmental totality sees an object existing for the sole purpose of being used to complete a task. Because an object in its ready-to-hand form exists in order to, equipmental totalities are constructed between objects – a hammer exists to hammer a nail. This sort of relationship is still functional is an equipmental totality, but expresses how objects can interact. Knowledge of the objects is limited in all cases to equipmental totalities as the meaning of the objects is only the purpose that the object fulfills. This meaning is one that is not a property derived through inspection, but known and utilized intuitively. The objects only have this equipmental totality. Consequently, ready-to-hand objects are described as being inconspicuous and escape deeper inspection. Knowledge of their properties does not exist (Being and Time, Section 15).
Knowledge of an object does exist if a ready-to-hand object exists. The knowledge exists because of and through an equipmental totality. As Husserl described knowledge, understanding of a ready-to-hand object is a product of fulfillment. However, this form of knowledge can only exist as an empty fulfillment because extensive and exhaustive knowledge does not exist. The signitive act is created because one saw a new object, for example a hammer. In learning the purpose of the hammer, one has created an intuitive act, which is then assigned to the object present to perceptions. This explains how the basic concept of what a hammer is, hammerness, is created. The link is made from the knowledge of the purpose of the object, a hammer hammers, and leads to the creation of knowledge relating to this object. It also explains how upon having the experience of the hammer, that one can hold the concept in ones mind and draw on it from time to time, such as the next time one needs to hammer use a hammer. Additional knowledge can exist concerning an object that is being viewed as ready-to-hand, but does not exist because of the nature of an object that is ready-to-hand. Such an object escapes one’s active consciousness and inspection, so that one does not have knowledge of the object beyond intuitively knowing what its purpose is. One will not know that this hammer is best used for a certain function or even the traits beyond the use that makes up hammerness. To obtain knowledge beyond this level, one must view the object in a different manner.
Viewing the object in a different manner creates a different type of object, an object that is present-at-hand. Present-at-hand objects are understood in a markedly different way from ready-to-hand. These are objects inspected deeply and which are conspicuous to one’s active conscious. This difference is best illuminated in the conversion of an object from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand. Objects gain their designation as present-at-hand, as Heidegger describes, from an exceptional experience of the object. The exceptional experience is something that brings the ready-to-hand object to the forefront of active consciousness and can be a missing object or an object that fails to function as expected. To continue the example of the hammer, imagine trying to hammer a nail into a wall to hang a painting with a forty-pound sledgehammer. This will obviously fail, as a sledgehammer is too large to hammer the nail properly. This fact is marked by the new, sledgehammer shaped, hole in the wall. Because of the failure of this hammer to work as a hammer, we are forced to try to understand why it failed. In doing so, the object is no longer viewed as ready-to-hand, but has come to our active, conscious analysis as present-at-hand (Being and Time, Section 16).
This additional analysis of the object expands the available knowledge of an object’s properties, and in so produces a more fulfilled concept of the object. As it stood before the investigation, we had a signitive act of an object, a hammer. We merely knew what the equipmental totality of the hammer was. We know nothing but how to use intuitively an object to fulfill a purpose. However, upon the conscious investigation, one learns of the properties associated with the object. For the case of the sledgehammer, we learn that this hammer is not used for driving small nails into a wall because it is too large and unwieldy. We can even gain understanding of what makes up a hammer - its head and handle with each made of a hard substance to withstand the stress of hammering something. The properties of other hammers can also become known, such as the desirable size for a hammer to use on nails. This, in a sense, is learning through failure. However, because one now has this conscious experience of the properties of this and other hammers, derived from an intuitive act, one can create a greater level of knowledge by reevaluating and expanding on our previous definition, or signitive act, of hammers.
The fulfillment of the signitive act of a present-at-hand object is the result of the active, conscious inspection. Upon the additional features of the object - the size and structure of a hammer for example - being brought out by active consciousness, one can assign more traits to an object. Husserl’s account of knowledge required that the object for which knowledge is created be conscious to the mind. This was a requirement so that a reference between the intuitive and signitive acts could be established in order to increase knowledge. An object that is ready-to-hand, by comparison, only has the intuitively accessed information of the function, but not of the features. Additionally, the object cannot be fully fulfilled through a single failure of the object to function. But with each failure, new, additional features of the object, now present-at-hand, are brought to light. As time passes, our concept, or signitive act of the object becomes fuller.
The interesting case of misusing an object becomes clear in the light of this view of Heideggerean objects. The example comes from a time when needing to use a hammer to hammer a nail. No hammer was present to complete this task, but a wrench was present and was successfully used to hammer a nail. Misusing an object, such as using a wrench to hammer a nail, seems impossible with objects existing only as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. As an exceptional experience of a hammer, this event could bring to active consciousness and conspicuousness the properties of a hammer through the search for the hammer: a quest for the hammerness of the hammer. This explains how knowledge of the hammer increases through the object’s absence. However, it does not explain how the object that is misused takes the functional place of the object that is absent. The validation for this possibility cannot be seen directly in the presence of the categories of objects themselves. The properties of the wrench are not known when it is ready-to-hand. This is because the wrench is ready-to-hand in the room but is not failing to perform its function. It is not performing any function, so it cannot be present-at-hand and therefore it is not present to consciousness in a way that its properties may be determined through analysis. Despite these facts, this phenomenon of misuse still exists.
The answer to this problem comes in Husserl’s form of fulfillment. Initially the hammer is in the ready-to-hand form and so its fulfillment is lacking, but from experience, one is placed in situations in which the hammer fails to function. In the specific case of misuse, its absence creates the failure. Such failures act to increase our concept of a hammer, and over time, slowly making our signitive act of hammer more fulfilled to the point, when necessary, where one can see a hammer as more than just an object that hammers. However, in its common everydayness we still view and interact with a hammer by its equipmental totality. Over time, experience adds to our understanding of what a hammer is beyond its function and the understanding can be drawn on whenever it is needed. A similar series of occurrences would cause for the properties of the wrench to become a more fulfilled signitive act. These two mental acts would then interact. One would inspect the objects in the world looking for objects with similar properties to a hammer, notably the weight, the general size, the material of construction and other such important traits. The two objects that share these properties could be used interchangeably for a certain purpose – one would not use a block of cheese to hammer a nail. The wrench has the properties that hammer needs to function as a hammer, though it is not specialized for that specific function, so that in the absence of a hammer a wrench could hammer a nail.
The final question concerning how misusing a tool is possible is what drives the interaction of these mental acts that constitute our signitive acts of a hammer and a wrench to interact. In other words, what makes this interaction possible with two unrelated objects and without prior experience? The possibility of this becomes known through Heidegger’s exploration of the concept of dasein. Dasein’s translation is literally being there, or existence. Heidegger used dasein to describe the part of an entity that is concerned with Being. Being is the concern for the nature or meaning of something. Dasein would allow for questioning what it means to be a hammer. Through an analysis of our concept of a hammer and the task that needs to be completed, one would find the appropriate traits that make up Being-a-hammer-as-itself. The traits that allow for something Being-a-hammer are found present in other objects. Dasein would drive the mind to view other objects in a different manner than just its function and one would then develop a concept of how different objects could perform the task of being a hammer. These objects would have the potential of Being-a-hammer. This analysis would in turn lead to the realization that a wrench could perform this task - Being-a-wrench-as-a-hammer - and would facilitate our misusage of this object to fulfill our goal of hammering a nail (Being and Time, Sections 12 and 13).
Husserl’s view of fulfillment becomes vital to Heidegger’s view of objects in the world because there is a necessity for gaining knowledge about the objects for them to serve a purpose and for interactions to take place. The world is full of objects that are ready-to-hand. However, to prevent one from having to relearn the purpose of each of these objects every time one is viewed, fulfillment must occur to construct lasting knowledge. This knowledge validates the ease that one can operate in a world of known equipmental totalities. However, when one of these objects, and its equipmental totality, fails to function, an object comes to the forefront of active consciousness. The object is inspected and the properties of the object, beyond its equipmental totality, are ascertained. These properties are added to the mental concept of an object as the signitive act is further fulfilled. Though one operates in a world of equipmental totalities, knowledge beyond the intuitive use of the totality is stored for future use and available when needed. This can be seen in misusing a tool when the proper tool for the task is not available. Because both the tool for the task and the tool that is misused to complete the task have signitive acts that were further fulfilled when the objects were present-at-hand, these properties can be compared through dasein in order to determine another object that would suit the task needing to be completed. The potential for the misused object as Being-as-another-object would be discovered so that the object can then be located and used in the world to fulfill a task outside of that object’s equipmental totality.
Work Cited
Heidegger, Martin. Trans: Macquarrie and Robinson. Being and Time. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1962
Husserl, Edmund. Trans: Findlay. The Shorter Logical Investigations. New York: Routledge, 1970.
posted by Christopher Robert at 11:23 PM
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